## **Proof Spaces**

Andreas Podelski

joint work with:

Matthias Heizmann, Jürgen Christ, Daniel Dietsch, Jochen Hoenicke, Azadeh Farzan, Zachary Kincaid, Markus Lindenmann, Betim Musa, Christian Schilling, Alexander Nutz, Stefan Wissert, Evren Ermis

## proof spaces

- new paradigm for automatic verification
- automata
- Marc Segelken: ω-Cegar [CAV 2007]
- verification for networked traffic control systems

### **Ultimate Automizer**





Matthias Heizmann, Jürgen Christ, Daniel Dietsch, Jochen Hoenicke, Azadeh Farzan, Zachary Kincaid, Markus Lindenmann, Betim Musa, Christian Schilling, Alexander Nutz, Stefan Wissert, Evren Ermis

- Refinement of Trace Abstraction. <u>SAS 2009</u>
- Nested interpolants. POPL 2010
- Interpolant Automata. <u>ATVA 2012</u>
- Ultimate Automizer with SMTInterpol (Competition Contribution). <u>TACAS 2013</u>
- Automata as Proofs. VMCAI 2013
- Inductive data flow graphs. <u>POPL 2013</u>
- Software Model Checking for People Who Love Automata. <u>CAV 2013</u>
- Ultimate Automizer with Unsatisfiable Cores (Competition Contribution). TACAS 2014
- Termination Analysis by Learning Terminating Programs. <u>CAV 2014</u>
- Proofs that count. POPL 2014:
- Ultimate Automizer with Array Interpolation (Competition Contribution). TACAS 2015
- Automated Program Verification. LATA 2015
- Fairness Modulo Theory: A New Approach to LTL Software Model Checking. <u>CAV 2015</u>
- Proof Spaces for Unbounded Parallelism. POPL 2015

invited talk: ETAPS 2012, ATVA 2012, VMCAI 2013, CAV 2013, LATA 2015

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### The AVACS Vision

To Cover the Model- and Requirement Space of Complex Safety Critical Systems

with Automatic Verification Methods

Giving Mathematical Evidence of Compliance of Models

To Dependability, Coordination, Control and Real-Time Requirements



## Automating Verification of Cooperation, Control, and Design in Traffic Applications \*

Werner Damm<sup>1,2</sup>, Alfred Mikschl<sup>1</sup>, Jens Oehlerking<sup>1</sup>, Ernst-Rüdiger Olderog<sup>1</sup>, Jun Pang<sup>1</sup>, André Platzer<sup>1</sup>, Marc Segelken<sup>2</sup>, and Boris Wirtz<sup>1</sup>



Fig. 4. Radio-based train control



Fig. 5. Snapshot of dynamic calculations

holistic verification methodology

dedicated methods for:

- cooperation layer
- control layer
- design layer

model checking for discrete hybrid systems - Lin AlGs - ω-Cegar



Fig. 17. The Lin-AIG structure

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### Abstraction and Counterexample-guided Construction of ω-automata for Model Checking of Step-discrete linear Hybrid Models\*

Marc Segelken

CAV 2007, LNCS 4590, pp. 433-448, 2007.

<sup>\*</sup> This research was partially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) under contract SFB/TR 14 AVACS, see www.avacs.org

Construction of  $\omega$ -automaton. Thus we follow a strategy of completely ruling out generalized conflicts by constructing an  $\omega$ -automaton  $A_C$  that accepts all runs not containing any known conflict as a subsequence. Considering partial regulation laws as atomic characters and C as the set of all previously detected generalized conflicts, the behavior of  $A_C$  can be described by an LTL formula:

$$A_C \models \neg \mathbf{F} \bigvee_{(\rho_1, \rho_2, \dots, \rho_k) \in C} (\rho_1 \wedge \mathbf{X}(\rho_2 \wedge \mathbf{X}(\dots \wedge \mathbf{X}\rho_n)))$$
(21)

automata over an unusual alphabet ...

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no execution violates assertion = no execution reaches error location



automaton

alphabet: {statements}



(p != 0) (n >= 0) (p == 0)



(p != 0) (p != 0) (n >= 0) (p==0) (p == 0) (p==0)

(p==0)





(p != 0)

(p==0)

#### automaton constructed from unsatisfiability proof



accepts all traces with the same unsatisfiability proof



#### does a proof exist for every trace ?







$$(p != 0) (n >= 0) (n == 0) (n == 0) (p := 0) (n--) (n--) (n >= 0) (n >= 0) (p == 0)$$









 $\Sigma$ 

 $\Sigma \setminus \{ n - - \}$ 

 $\Sigma \setminus \{ n-- \}$ 

 $\Sigma$ 

#### does a proof exist for every trace ?

?



### automata constructed from unsatisfiable core

### are not sufficient in general

(verification algorithm not complete)



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# Hoare triples proving infeasibility :

{ true } 
$$x:=0$$
 { $x \ge 0$ }  
{ $x \ge 0$ }  $y:=0$  { $x \ge 0$ }  
{ $x \ge 0$ }  $x++$  { $x \ge 0$ }  
{ $x \ge 0$ }  $x=-1$  { false }

infeasibility  $\Leftrightarrow$  pre/postcondition pair (true, false)

#### Hoare triples $\mapsto$ automaton



#### Hoare triples $\mapsto$ automaton



sequencing of Hoare triples  $\mapsto$  run of automaton

## inference rule for sequencing



#### proof space

infinite space of Hoare triples "{pre} trace {post}"

closed under inference rule of sequencing

generated from finite basis of Hoare triples "{pre} stmt {post}"

## proof of sample trace:

{ true } 
$$x:=0$$
 { $x \ge 0$ }  
{ $x \ge 0$ }  $y:=0$  { $x \ge 0$ }  
{ $x \ge 0$ }  $x++$  { $x \ge 0$ }  
{ $x \ge 0$ }  $x=-1$  { false }

finite basis of Hoare triples "{pre} stmt {post}"

can be obtained from proofs of sample traces

proof space

infinite space of Hoare triples "{pre} trace {post}"

closed under inference rule of sequencing

#### finite basis of Hoare triples "{pre} stmt {post}" $\mapsto$ automaton



sequencing of Hoare triples in basis  $\mapsto$  run of automaton

#### proof space

infinite space of Hoare triples "{pre} trace {post}"

closed under inference rule of sequencing

generated from finite basis of Hoare triples "{pre} stmt {post}"

paradigm:

construct proof space

- check proof space

simplify task for program verification:

Don't give a proof.

Show that a proof exists.

### automata: existence of accepting run

inclusion check: show that, for every word in the given set, an accepting run *exists*  simplify task for program verification:

Show that, for every program execution, a proof exists.